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SYMPOSIUM:   
CRUEL AND UNUSUAL PUNISHMENT:   
LITIGATING UNDER THE EIGHTH AMENDMENT 
PRISON HEALTH CARE, POLITICAL CHOICE, AND THE 
ACCIDENTAL DEATH PENALTY 
Elizabeth Alexander* 
In Hadix v. Caruso, I represent a class of prisoners in a decades-
long case challenging conditions of confinement, including medical 
care, at various Michigan prison facilities.1  Since August 2006, I have 
been haunted by the death of one of those prisoners because, in ret-
rospect, his death appears to be the inevitable by-product of a prison 
system swollen beyond any historical precedents, or its ability to man-
age such a huge number of people safely.  Prisons are in fact extraor-
dinarily difficult to operate safely and humanely, and the United 
States will continue to fail to do so absent a fundamental change in 
criminal justice policy.  This Article seeks to trace some connections 
between a dysfunctional criminal justice policy and the death of one 
man. 
Prison systems like Michigan’s have been allowed to operate un-
safe prisons because the federal courts have failed to provide an ef-
fective form of oversight, and no other form of serious oversight ex-
ists in the United States.  In a series of decisions, the Supreme Court 
has preserved the form of Eighth Amendment challenges to condi-
tions of confinement, but little of the substance, by allowing severely 
 
 * Elizabeth Alexander is the Director of the National Prison Project of the American Civil 
Liberties Union Foundation.  She would like to thank Patricia Streeter, who has served as 
an extraordinary co-counsel in Hadix v. Caruso (Hadix III), 465 F. Supp. 2d 776 (W.D. 
Mich. 2006).  I am also grateful for the assistance of Susan Pourciau, a third-year law stu-
dent at Duke University School of Law, and Darcy Hirsh, a third-year law student at Ben-
jamin N. Cardozo School of Law. 
 1 See, e.g., Hadix v. Caruso (Hadix III), 465 F. Supp. 2d 776, 778–79 (W.D. Mich. 2006) (de-
tailing the history of the litigation), vacated, 248 F. App’x 678 (6th Cir. 2007) (per cu-
riam).  Until recent years, the case was known as Hadix v. Johnson, and generated a large 
number of judicial opinions.  See, e.g., Hadix v. Johnson (Hadix I), 367 F.3d 513 (6th Cir. 
2004) (remanding finding of a constitutional violation regarding fire safety). 
  
2 JOURNAL OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAW [Vol. 11:1 
 
overcrowded prisons,2 suggesting that considerations of cost can de-
feat an Eighth Amendment claim,3 and allowing Eighth Amendment 
claims to be defeated even when prison conditions are objectively in-
tolerable and deny prisoners basic human needs, including health 
care.4  Unfortunately, Michigan may ultimately illustrate that the only 
real restraint on prison growth is its cost, not the Constitution. 
I.  THE LONESOME DEATH OF TIMOTHY SOUDERS 
Timothy Souders arrived at the Southern Michigan Correctional 
Facility in March 2006 with medical problems that included a thyroid 
disorder and cardiac risk factors.5  He also had been diagnosed with 
bipolar disorder and depression, and had attempted suicide multiple 
times.6  It was duly noted in his medical record that, because of his 
medications and medical problems, he was at very high risk of injury 
if exposed to excessive heat.7 
In March 2006, the prison psychiatrist changed Mr. Souders’s me-
dications, prescribed lithium for his bipolar disorder, and subse-
quently increased his lithium.  There are no records of laboratory 
monitoring of the level of lithium in his blood for the relevant pe-
riod,8 although elevated lithium levels are toxic and can cause symp-
toms ranging from mental confusion to life-threatening side effects 
such as kidney failure.9  Monitoring lithium levels in the blood is con-
sidered absolutely necessary when lithium is prescribed, and high li-
thium levels are particularly dangerous in someone who is dehy-
drated.10 
 
 2 See Rhodes v. Chapman, 452 U.S. 337, 348–49 (1981) (explaining that when overcrowd-
ing has not been shown to inflict wanton pain or lead to deprivation of basic necessities, 
such as food, it does not violate the Eighth Amendment). 
 3 Wilson v. Seiter, 501 U.S. 294, 301–02 (1991) (noting and not rejecting the argument that 
requiring a showing that prison officials are deliberately indifferent in order for prison 
conditions to violate the Eighth Amendment would allow prison officials to prevail by 
showing fiscal constraints and stating that interpretation of the Eighth Amendment is 
controlled by its language, not by policy considerations). 
 4 Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 837–38 (1994) (defining the deliberate indifference 
standard required to show an Eighth Amendment violation in prison conditions in a 
manner parallel to the recklessness standard in the criminal law). 
 5 Hadix v. Caruso (Hadix II), 461 F. Supp. 2d 574, 577, 579 (W.D. Mich. 2006). 
 6 Id. at 578. 
 7 Transcript of Hearing on October 11-13, 2006, at 265–66, Hadix II, 461 F. Supp. 2d 574 
(No. 06-2591) [hereinafter Hearing]; Plaintiffs’ Exhibit 114, at 152158, Hadix II, 461 
F. Supp. 2d 574 (No. 06-2591) (providing Timothy Souders’s medical record). 
 8 Plaintiffs’ Exhibit 114 at 152157, Hadix II, 461 F. Supp. 2d 574 (No. 06-2591). 
 9 Hearing, supra note 7, at 134–35; see also Hadix II, 461 F. Supp. 2d at 579. 
 10 Hearing, supra note 7, at 134–35; Hadix II, 461 F. Supp. 2d at 579. 
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Near the end of May 2006, the psychiatrist went on medical leave 
and thereafter there was no psychiatrist on-site for the 1,400 prisoners 
at the prison.11  In June, Mr. Souders was involved in a fight with an-
other prisoner and was ordered to punitive detention.  After thirty 
days, he was released but sent back to the segregation unit for taking 
an unauthorized shower during an August day on which the heat in-
dex was over 90.12 
He was put in a boxcar cell—essentially, an unventilated cell with 
no windows and a solid metal door, rather than an open-barred cell 
front—on the sixth level of the prison.13  When staff opened the food 
slot in one of the solid doors, which is how staff talked to prisoners in 
those cells, on hot days they could feel a blast of hot air from inside 
the cell.14  During the next few days the heat index in the cells rose to 
around 100.15 
On August 2, 2006, Mr. Souders damaged the metal stool in his 
cell and was put into standing restraints.16  When he tried to flood his 
sink, according to custody records, a supervisory nurse approved cut-
ting off the water to the cell.17  That restriction was removed only be-
cause someone noticed that the whole prison was on heat alert 
status.18  Mr. Souders was then put on top-of-bed restraints on a con-
crete slab, with metal restraints on his wrists and ankles.19  Use of 
these types of restraint is well known to carry a risk of death from as-
 
 11 Hadix II, 461 F. Supp. 2d at 584; Plaintiffs’ Exhibit 5H at 322346–48, Hadix II, 461 F. 
Supp. 2d 574 (No. 06-2591). 
 12 Prison Events Timeline, Plaintiffs’ Exhibit 106A at 1, Hadix II, 461 F. Supp. 2d 574 (No. 
06-2591); Hearing, supra note 7, at 191–204; Investigation Records Re:  Mr. Souders’ 
Death, Plaintiffs’ Exhibit 42, at 320501, Hadix II, 461 F. Supp. 2d 574 (No. 06-2591) 
[hereinafter Investigation Records] (providing the segregation record).  The heat index 
combines temperature and humidity into a measurement that more accurately reflects 
human perception of the apparent temperature.  Heat index, rather than temperature, is 
routinely used to measure risk of heat injury under particular conditions.  A heat index of 
90, roughly speaking, “feels” like a temperature of 90°F.  National Oceanic and Atmos-
pheric Administration, Heat Index and Humidity from Temperature and Dewpoint, 
http://www.crh.noaa.gov/jkl/?n=heat_index_calculator (last visited Nov. 5, 2008). 
 13 See Plaintiffs’ Exhibit 106B, Hadix II, 461 F. Supp. 2d 574 (No. 06-2591) (showing Mr. 
Souders’s cell confinement).  For a description of a boxcar cell, see United States v. Koch, 
552 F.2d 1216, 1218 (7th Cir. 1977). 
 14 Deposition of Francis Duffy, Plaintiffs’ Exhibit 103, at 73, Hadix II, 461 F. Supp. 2d 574 
(No. 06-2591). 
 15 Hadix II, 461 F. Supp. 2d at 579. 
 16 Id. at 577; Investigation Records, supra note 12, at 320904, 320906. 
 17 Investigation Records, supra note 12, at 320904, 320844.  The nurse subsequently denied 
remembering whether she authorized the restraints or not.  Deposition of Betty Glaser, 
Plaintiffs’ Exhibit 104, at 38, Hadix II, 461 F. Supp. 2d 574 (No. 06-2591). 
 18 Investigation Records, supra note 12, at 320844. 
 19 Hadix II, 461 F. Supp. 2d at 577. 
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phyxiation, heart attack, and dehydration.20  That day the social 
worker who was in charge of mental health services for the prison 
characterized Mr. Souders as “floridly psychotic.”21  From August 2 
through August 5, the segregation log and the video camera used in 
his cell document that Mr. Souders was repeatedly screaming inco-
herently.22  Between August 2 and August 6, Mr. Souders rarely ac-
cepted water.23  During the first two days he was in restraints, the 
video camera staff used to film him fogged up and staff complained 
of the heat and humidity in his cell.24  As the use of restraints contin-
ued, Mr. Souders was held in restraints naked.25  He urinated in his 
restraints and he developed burn-like sores on his body from lying in 
his own waste.26  At one point, custody records indicate that Mr. 
Souders was transported to the prison’s unaccredited on-site “hospi-
tal,” but the physician there declined to examine him, apparently be-
cause he urinated on the examining table.27 
On August 6, correctional officers walked him to the showers; the 
video shows him staggering.  Shortly thereafter, the restraints were 
removed.  He then fell to the floor of his cell and was unable to get 
up.  Correctional officers returned him to the slab.28  A nurse exam-
ined Mr. Souders in his cell and told him that his pulse was faint, a 
symptom that indicated that he had experienced a drastic fall in his 
cardiac output.29  The nurse then left the cell without doing anything 
to assist him.30  For the next hour there was no movement in the 
cell.31  Then staff reentered the cell because Mr. Souders did not ap-
pear to be breathing.32  He was pronounced dead shortly thereafter, 
at the age of 21.33 
Michigan allows “limited license psychologists” to treat prisoners 
absent supervision even though they are not eligible to treat people 
in the community without supervision by a fully-licensed psycholo-
 
 20 Id. at 580–81, 595. 
 21 Id. at 578. 
 22 Investigation Records, supra note 12, at 320951–56, 320958–62; Plaintiffs’ Exhibit 106B, 
supra note 13. 
 23 Investigation Records, supra note 12, at 320952–62, 320964, 320966, 320969. 
 24 Plaintiffs’ Exhibit 106B, supra note 13. 
 25 Hadix II, 461 F. Supp. 2d at 577. 
 26 Id. 
 27 Id. 
 28 Id. at 579. 
 29 Id. at 579–80. 
 30 Id. at 580. 
 31 Plaintiffs’ Exhibit 106B, supra note 13. 
 32 Hadix II, 461 F. Supp. 2d at 580. 
 33 Id. at 577, 580. 
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gist.34  The limited-license psychologist who last saw Mr. Souders alive 
had an undergraduate degree in theology and a master’s degree in 
community counseling.35  This limited-license psychologist had seen 
the psychologist who was officially “supervising” him once, from a dis-
tance, in the preceding year.36  The person who diagnosed Mr. Soud-
ers as floridly psychotic was a psychiatric social worker and also was 
not licensed to practice in the community without formal supervi-
sion.37  Aside from the prison system’s employment of staff who are 
not fully licensed, the staff demonstrated a pervasive indifference to 
community standards of care, as illustrated by the psychiatrist’s fail-
ure to perform routine tests for toxic levels of lithium that any psy-
chiatrist in the community would have required.38 
Staff resources were severely stressed.  The Director of Nursing at 
the prison where Mr. Souders died testified that the prison complex 
needed about eleven more registered nurses to deliver health care.  
Almost a third of the registered nursing positions were filled by li-
censed practical nurses.39  Even today, despite Mr. Souders’s death, 
the Department has no policy that requires large prisons with segre-
gation units, which are typically full of mentally ill prisoners, to have 
on-site psychiatrists.40 
 
 34 Psychology Supervision Update and Doctoral Education Limited Licenses, 
http://www.michigan.gov/documents/mdch/mdch_psycsuperrequ11_09_06_177860_7.
pdf (last visited Nov. 5, 2008). 
 35 Deposition of Allan Small, Plaintiffs’ Exhibit 105, at 5–6, Hadix II, 461 F. Supp. 2d 574 
(No. 06-2591).  This psychologist was involved in another patient death case during the 
same period.  Hadix II, 461 F. Supp. 2d at 581–82.  He thought that the second patient 
might have been suffering paranoid delusions, but did not refer the patient to a psychia-
trist because the patient was refusing treatment.  Id. at 582.  Over a year after the patient 
was known to suffer from toxic levels of thyroid hormone, the staff finally petitioned for 
the appointment of a guardian to authorize medical treatment, but the patient died be-
fore treatment could be authorized.  Id. at 582–83.  The court found numerous other in-
stances of inadequate psychological and psychiatric treatment of prisoners, some of 
whom committed suicide.  Id. at 583–84. 
 36 Hadix II, 461 F. Supp. 2d at 585. 
 37 Id. 
 38 See id. at 579 n.2 (describing Mr. Souders’s treatment as “not clinically appropriate”). 
 39 Deposition of Debbie Roth, Plaintiffs’ Exhibit 107, at 50–54, Hadix II, 461 F. Supp. 2d 574 
(No. 06-2591); see also Hadix III, 465 F. Supp. 2d 776, 792–93 (W.D. Mich. 2006) (noting 
testimony that nursing staff levels were inadequate), vacated, 248 F. App’x 678 (6th Cir. 
2007) (per curiam). 
 40 The psychiatrists in the system are employed by the Department of Community Health 
and are part of out-patient mental health teams.  DEP’T OF CMTY. HEALTH, PERFORMANCE 
AUDIT OF THE CORRECTIONAL MENTAL HEALTH PROGRAM (1998), available at 
http://audgen.michigan.gov/comprpt/docs/r3965097.pdf.  Many of the high security 
prisons in the system do not have an out-patient team.  Defendants’ Status Report Re-
garding Transfer Grid, at Ex. A, Hadix v. Caruso, No. 4:92-CV-110 (W.D. Mich. March 15, 
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The medical staff operate in a culture of deference to custody that 
interferes with care.  That culture explains the behavior of the nurse 
who told custody that there was no reason why Mr. Souders could not 
be placed on a water restriction despite his medical problems and the 
conditions within his boxcar cell.41  It similarly explains the conduct 
of the doctor who knew of Mr. Souders’s urine burns, but neither 
treated him nor objected to the use of restraints by custody.42  That 
culture also explains how a registered nurse could fail to initiate 
treatment when he learned that Mr. Souders had developed a weak 
pulse.43  All of these individual failures took place in a context in 
which no medical or mental health staff perceived a need to inter-
vene.  Nor did any medical staff question why custody made the deci-
sion to put a mentally ill man into restraints.  Nor did anyone ques-
tion leaving a man in restraints within a boxcar cell where staff could 
not readily observe him.  As the medical director for the Michigan 
prison system admitted, there was ample opportunity for medical, 
mental health, and custodial staff to intervene, but it never hap-
pened.44 
The autopsy determined that the cause of death was hyperther-
mia, with dehydration as a secondary cause, but it characterized the 
death as an “accident.”45  While no one has asserted that any staff 
member actively desired the death of Mr. Souders, I cannot accept 
the claim that the death was an accident.  Rather, the death of Mr. 
Souders and other victims followed inevitably from the decision of 
the State of Michigan to imprison almost 50,000 people but fail to 
provide the resources necessary to provide them with minimally ade-
quate health care, combined with a staff culture of willful blindness to 
the risks that this lack of care entailed. 
 
2007) (identifying a number of high security prisons, including Baraga Maximum Secu-
rity Facility, as not having any on-site psychiatric coverage); see also Michigan Department 
of Corrections, Baraga Maximum Correctional Facility (AMF), http://www.michigan.
gov/corrections/1,1607,7-119-1381_1388-5325--,00.html (last visited Nov. 5, 2008) (not-
ing that Baraga Maximum Correctional Facility confines prisoners with the highest secu-
rity classification (Level V), with four out of seven housing units designated as segrega-
tion units).  For purposes of clarity, I will not cite unpublished Hadix filings to any of the 
published Hadix cases. 
 41 See supra note 18 and accompanying text. 
 42 See supra note 27 and accompanying text. 
 43 See supra note 30 and accompanying text. 
 44 Hadix II, 461 F. Supp. 2d at 580. 
 45 Plaintiffs’ Exhibit A to Stipulation at 1, Hadix II, 461 F. Supp. 2d 574 (No. 06-2591) (pro-
viding the Timothy Souders Autopsy Report). 
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II.  JUST ANOTHER BRICK IN THE WALL 
As might be expected from the number and variety of deficiencies 
in the medical and mental health care implicated in the death of 
Timothy Souders, this death took place against a backdrop of sys-
temically inadequate care.  For some years, the Michigan prison sys-
tem has chosen to concentrate its sickest prisoners in the Hadix facili-
ties.46  As of early 2007, at the largest Hadix prison, half of the 
prisoners suffered from at least one chronic disease requiring ongo-
ing treatment.47  The apparent reason for this concentration of 
chronically ill prisoners was the proximity of Duane Waters Hospital, 
run by the Department of Corrections.  The hospital was required 
under a Consent Decree entered early in the Hadix litigation.48  For a 
substantial period of time, the hospital was accredited by the Joint 
Commission on Health Care Organizations, but that accreditation 
has now lapsed.49  Despite the lack of accreditation, the Department 
of Corrections continues to allow a surgeon who lacks admitting privi-
leges at any hospital to perform surgeries there.50 
Thus, although the Hadix facilities have served as the linchpin of 
the Michigan prison health care system, that linchpin is malfunction-
ing.  The Hadix court made findings in 2002 regarding hundreds of 
incidents in which prisoners received inadequate or delayed care, or 
no care at all.51  These findings included cases in which the medical 
system failed to provide timely access to prisoners with urgent and 
emergent serious medical problems, including failures resulting in 
death.52  Subsequent findings by the court-appointed medical moni-
tor, Robert Cohen, M.D., described multiple medical failures, includ-
 
 46 Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law at 82, Hadix v. Johnson, No. 4:92-CV-110 (W.D. 
Mich. Sept. 14, 2005); Hadix v. Caruso, No. 4:92-CV-110, slip op. at 2 (W.D. Mich. Mar. 6, 
2007).  In this Article, the term “Hadix prison” or “Hadix facility” means a prison unit con-
fining members of the certified class in Hadix, and subject to the district court’s Hadix 
orders. 
 47 Letter from Robert Cohen, M.D., Head of the Office of the Indep. Med. Monitor, to Hon. 
Richard A. Enslen at 3, Hadix v. Caruso, No. 4:92-CV-110 (W.D. Mich. Apr. 30, 2007) 
[hereinafter Cohen Letter]. 
 48 Consent Decree at 8, Hadix v. Johnson, No. 80-73581 (E.D. Mich. Feb. 13, 1985) (requir-
ing that the new hospital meet state licensure standards). 
 49 Hadix III, 465 F. Supp. 2d 776, 778 (W.D. Mich. 2006). 
 50 E-mail from Robert Cohen to Hadix parties (Nov. 29, 2007, 08:49 CST) (on file with au-
thor).  Robert Cohen, M.D., is the head of the Office of the Independent Medical Moni-
tor, established by the Hadix court.  Hadix III, 465 F. Supp. 2d at 779–80, 809–810. 
 51 Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law 28–190, Hadix v. Johnson, No. 4:92-CV-110 
(W.D. Mich. Oct. 29, 2002). 
 52 Hadix III, 465 F. Supp. 2d at 779 (summarizing the 2002 findings). 
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ing a prisoner who died of an untreated “staph”53 infection and gas-
tro-intestinal bleeding; an HIV patient with difficulty in swallowing 
who, despite a weight loss to 108 pounds, was denied the pureed diet 
he needed; and a diabetic who predictably died of hypoglycemia after 
gross failures of treatment and monitoring, accompanied by a failure 
to respond to his emergency needs.54 
The court medical monitor and the Director of Medical Care for 
the Department of Corrections, a physician, jointly reviewed six ran-
domly selected medical records of Hadix class members whose spe-
cialty care appointments had been delayed.  In one case, there were 
no apparent consequences from the delay; in a second case, the only 
effect may have been to force the prisoner to experience unnecessary 
pain.  In the other four cases, the Hadix court concluded, the delay 
exposed the prisoners to the “prospect of unnecessary death and 
grossly unnecessary suffering.”55 
These cases included a man who was allowed to go untreated for 
an extended period without diagnosis or treatment for a kidney stone 
that was rendering his kidney non-functional.  Another man with 
textbook signs of an impending heart attack was improperly sched-
uled to be seen in thirty days rather than immediately.  By the time 
he was seen, he was lucky to survive his emergency bypass surgery.  
Another patient with known symptoms of bowel cancer had his diag-
nosis delayed for over a year.  He proved to have an abnormal, poten-
tially pre-cancerous lesion.56  Perhaps equally striking, after the diag-
nosis, the patient was not scheduled for follow-up until his case was 
discovered in the random case review.57 
The last patient whose file was randomly chosen for review had 
complained that a mole on his back was increasing in size.  He kited 
(prison jargon for sending a written request for assistance to staff) 
repeatedly and was diagnosed with a “melanocystic skin mole” that 
 
 53 Staphylococcus aureus is a common skin infection that can become life-threatening under 
certain conditions.  Drug-resistant forms of Staphylococcus aureus (methicillin-resistant 
Staphylococcus aureus, or MRSA, and vancomycin-resistant Staphylococcus aureus, or VRSA) 
have recently and notoriously become common in prisons and jails, as well as in hospitals 
and other institutional settings.  Ctrs. for Disease Control & Prevention, Staphylococcus 
Aureus Resistant to Vancomycin—United States, 2002, MORBIDITY & MORTALITY WKLY., July 5, 
2002, available at http://www.cdc.gov/MMWR/preview/mmwrhtml/mm5126a1.htm; Na-
tional Institute of Corrections, Methicillin-Resistant Staphylococcus Aureus (MRSA), available 
at http://www. nicic.org/MRSA (last visited Nov. 5, 2008). 
 54 Hadix III, 465 F. Supp. 2d at 780–81. 
 55 Id. at 786. 
 56 Id. at 786–87. 
 57 Hearing, supra note 7, at 593. 
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needed to be “watched closely.”58  Nonetheless, a subsequent medical 
order to remove the mole in two weeks resulted in no treatment; a 
nurse told him to apply a hot compress to the mole.  More than six 
months after he began kiting, in January 2006, he saw medical staff 
again, by which time the mole had grown into a black-red mass with 
irregular margins and bleeding.  About two weeks later, a pathology 
report indicated malignant melanoma.  He did not receive the next 
necessary step in the diagnostic process, a sentinel node biopsy to de-
termine whether he had metastatic cancer, until April 2006.  That bi-
opsy showed that the cancer had spread while he was not receiving 
treatment.59 
Unfortunately, the mistreatment of this patient did not end de-
spite the Hadix court’s December 2006 opinion noting the previous 
delays in diagnosing his cancer.  The medical monitor subsequently 
discovered that the patient’s chemotherapy had been significantly in-
terrupted when staff did not order his cancer treatment drugs in a 
timely manner.  When the drugs were ordered, staff specified an in-
sufficient quantity for the chemotherapy.60 
These delays in care took place in the context of a system that al-
lowed 30% to 40% of the cancer patients at any given time to fail to 
receive treatment within the time frames set by their physicians.  This 
occurred, even though, as the Hadix court found, those physicians of-
ten set dates for patients to be seen that were too far in the future 
and often failed to take appropriate initial steps for timely diagnosis 
of cancer.61  For example, another patient waited nine months for a 
biopsy of his suspected cancer.  He finally received a biopsy diagnos-
ing prostate cancer on March 19, 2007.  As of early July 2007, the pa-
tient had developed bloody urine and was still not yet scheduled for 
surgery.62 
The medication distribution system is also broken.  A randomized 
study of medication prescription and renewal by the medical moni-
tor’s office concluded that each month, hundreds of prisoners kited 
within the Hadix facilities because their medications had been inter-
 
 58 Hadix III, 465 F. Supp. 2d at 787. 
 59 Id. 
 60 Hadix v. Caruso, No. 4:92-CV-110, slip op. at 2–3 (W.D. Mich. May 4, 2007). 
 61 Hadix III, 465 F. Supp. 2d at 791. 
 62 Plaintiffs’ Ex. 8 Hearing on Motion for Temporary Restraining Order, Hadix v. Caruso, 
No. 4:92-CV-110 (W.D. Mich. July 18, 2007); Declaration of Robert Camaj, Hadix v. 
Caruso, No. 4:92-CV-110 (W.D. Mich. July 18, 2007). 
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rupted.63  There is no functioning system to assure renewals of medi-
cations even when staff know of the need for renewals.  As a result, 
even HIV medications go unrenewed.  Although the problem is 
widely known among health care staff, nothing is done to address the 
problem.64  In fact, a physician in the Hadix facilities refused to renew 
medications in a timely fashion.  The medical monitor documented 
that records containing medication renewal requests, abnormal labo-
ratory test results, and specialty consultation reports piled up unread 
in physicians’ offices.  The monitor also documented waits of three to 
four weeks to see a physician, with physicians canceling scheduled pa-
tient appointments without cause.65 
As of the last date for which I have data, half of the registered 
nurse positions were not filled by permanent staff.66  Of those filled by 
temporary contract staff, 60% of the positions were filled by licensed 
practical nurses rather than registered nurses.67  As a result, licensed 
practical nurses take actions that they are not qualified to perform.68  
The nursing shortages also result in medical kites from prisoners go-
ing unanswered for days at a time.69 
Medical treatment is equally bad at the dialysis unit, where a 
number of the prisoners with the most complex medical problems 
are housed.  An outside nephrologist review reported that the medi-
cal director “appeared disengaged”70 and that there were seriously de-
ficiencies in water testing and documentation, management of vascu-
lar access complications, blood pressure management, specialty care 
referrals and testing, medication continuity, and emergency care.71  
Registered nurses assigned to the dialysis unit have been administer-
ing medications in a variety of unapproved ways, including re-labeling 
medications dispensed by the pharmacist for prisoners who have left 
the facility in order to administer them to other prisoners, failing to 
check medication orders correctly before administering them to 
prisoners, and relying on an outmoded system to check that the cor-
 
 63 First Report of the Office of Independent Medical Monitor 21–23, 31–33, Hadix v. 
Caruso, No. 4:92-CV-110 (W.D. Mich. July 18, 2007). 
 64 Memorandum from Robert Cohen, M.D., to Barbara Hladki 1 (Feb. 12, 2007) (on file 
with author). 
 65 Id. at 2. 
 66  Hadix III, 465 F. Supp. 2d at 793. 
 67  Id. 
 68 Id. 
 69 Id. 
 70 Eric M. Gibney, Report to the Office of the Independent Medical Monitor 1 (Jan. 11, 
2008) [hereinafter Gibney Report] (on file with the author). 
 71 Id. 
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rect medications are administered.72  Further, in part because medi-
cations are not being consistently ordered electronically, the medica-
tion regimens for the dialysis patients are frequently interrupted.  Ac-
cording to a review by the medical monitor, 61% of the dialysis 
prisoners experienced delays or interruptions of their prescribed 
medications.73  Although dialysis puts patients at risk for sepsis, most 
of the intravenous medications on hand to treat septic patients fol-
lowing hospital discharge are months or years past their expiration 
date, even though there can be a three-day delay in the dialysis unit’s 
ability to obtain new supplies of such medications.74 
Dialysis patients needing specialty care (other than urgent surgery 
when vascular access for dialysis fails) frequently do not receive that 
care or receive it only after significant delays.  As of December 2007, a 
dialysis patient with a cerebral aneurysm had been waiting since June 
2007 for surgery.  Another patient was receiving dialysis through a 
perma-catheter in his chest wall, which is a dangerous method for di-
alysis access because of the heightened risk of infection it poses.  The 
patient was delayed between September and December 2007 in ob-
taining surgery to create a standard arteriovenous shunt for dialysis.  
Shortly after the surgery, he was found to have a blood infection and 
was started on intravenous antibiotics.75 
A nephrologist consultant for the monitor’s office reviewed the 
deaths of a number of dialysis patients.  One of those deaths involved 
a patient whose cardiac symptoms were ignored over a long period, 
except for one physician’s attempt to obtain a stress test for him.  The 
prison contract medical provider, Correctional Medical Services, Inc. 
(“CMS”), denied the request.  Subsequently, the patient died of car-
diac arrest after his dialysis was delayed despite a life-threatening ele-
vation in his potassium level.76  Another dialysis patient died of a 
brain hemorrhage after his blood pressure problems were “ignored 
and mistreated” by medical staff for a year.77  He was treated with a 
single medication that cannot safely be used as the sole medication 
for severe hypertension, and his death “was directly related to his se-
 
 72 Draft, Office of the Independent Medical Monitor Dialysis Patient Medication Report 10–
12 (undated) (on file with the author). 
 73 Id. at 4. 
 74 Id. at 12. 
 75 Memorandum from Robert Cohen, M.D., to Peter Govorchin, et. al. 4–5 (Jan. 3, 2007) 
(on file with author). 
 76 Gibney Report, supra note 70, at 7–10. 
 77 Id. at 11. 
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vere, uncontrolled, and inappropriately managed blood pressure and 
failure to ensure accurate medication administration.”78 
Another dialysis death occurred after staff failed to note increas-
ing evidence of unstable cardiac disease.  Although one of the pa-
tient’s physicians did note that he needed an echocardiogram, the 
test was not performed.  A nurse who thereafter saw the patient at a 
time when he was experiencing classic symptoms of unstable angina 
did not refer the patient to a physician.  A month later, the physician 
again remarked that he needed an echocardiogram, but the test was 
not ordered.  The following month, the patient was finally sent to a 
hospital where he was diagnosed with a heart attack and died of car-
diac arrest following a bypass surgery.79  Another patient died after a 
delay in summoning an ambulance after the patient experienced a 
heart attack.  The autopsy indicated that he had a structurally normal 
heart, so prompt treatment of the heart attack might have saved his 
life.80 
After years of reviewing the failures of medical and mental health 
care, it is perhaps not surprising that the federal judge assigned to 
Hadix wrote that:  “[T]here are a large number of complicated cases 
with interdisciplinary problems that unfortunately are being regularly 
mistreated and/or ignored by staff.  The phenomenon is now a regu-
lar feature of the system.”81 
Understanding how such a prison staff culture could become em-
bedded requires a consideration of the larger policies that have 
shaped the Michigan criminal justice system. 
III.  MONEY FOR NOTHING 
As of the last available statistics, Michigan had per-prisoner medi-
cal costs that were about 108% of the national average.82  I consider 
the more significant statistic that Michigan spent $2,841 per prisoner 
on medical care in 2001, at a time that national spending on medical 
care was $4,370 per person per year.83  Of at least equal significance, 
 
 78 Id.  On several occasions, the patient was not given his prescribed medication, clonidine.  
Clonidine is particularly dangerous if the patient misses doses because the patient may 
experience life-threatening levels of “rebound” high blood pressure.  See id. at 10–11. 
 79 Id. at 12–13. 
 80 Id. at 14–15. 
 81 Hadix II, 461 F. Supp. 2d 574, 577, 598 (W.D. Mich. 2006). 
 82 JAMES J. STEPHAN, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, SPECIAL REPORT:  
STATE PRISON EXPENDITURES, 2001, at 6 (2004), available at http://www.ojp.usdoj. 
gov/bjs/pub/pdf/spe01.pdf. 
 83 Id. 
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Michigan has been receiving limited value for the money that it does 
spend on prison health care.  According to a report by the National 
Commission on Correctional Health Care (“NCCHC”), commis-
sioned by the Michigan Department of Corrections (“MDOC”), 
Michigan is getting poor value for the $300 million per year that it 
currently spends on medical care.84  Part of the problem, according to 
the report, was that Michigan contracts out physician services (other 
than psychiatrists) to CMS.85 
An NCCHC reviewer became concerned about the level of cogni-
tive functioning of one of the CMS physicians.  The physician’s medi-
cal records had so many errors of spelling and language use that parts 
of them were incomprehensible.  When the reviewer asked supervi-
sors about this physician, the supervisors were familiar with the prob-
lem but none believed he or she had the power to take action.86 
In addition, under its contract with the state, CMS pays for off-site 
specialty care and it decides whether a physician will be allowed to re-
fer a prisoner for such care.  As the NCCHC report suggests, the fact 
that the physicians work for CMS may explain why they rarely chal-
lenge the decision of CMS reviewers to deny their requests for spe-
cialty referrals.87  Similarly, this fact may explain why 30% to 40% of 
cancer patients, as noted earlier, experienced disruptions in their 
chemotherapy under this system.88 
A subsidiary of CMS, PharmaCorr, provides pharmacy services for 
the prison system.  PharmaCorr is not required to provide a consult-
ing pharmacist under the contract.89  Staff reported to the NCCHC 
that they experienced delays in receiving medications for “same day” 
delivery under the contract,90 which is not surprising because Phar-
maCorr ships all its medications to Michigan from its warehouse in 
Oklahoma.91  The report also found that the formulary (a list of me-
dications that a physician can prescribe without any additional au-
thorization from a reviewer) lacked classes of medications that are 
commonly included in the formularies of large health care organiza-
 
 84  2007 Mich. Pub. Acts No. 124 §§ 107, 208 (appropriating about $300 million to prison 
health care services in 2007). 
 85 NAT’L COMM’N ON CORR. HEALTH CARE, A COMPREHENSIVE ASSESSMENT OF THE MICHIGAN 
DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS HEALTH CARE SYSTEM 24 (2008), available at http://www. 
michigan.gov/documents/corrections/Final_MDOC_HCS_Report_222383_7.pdf. 
 86 Id. at 6. 
 87 Id. at 9. 
 88 See supra note 61 and accompanying text. 
 89  NAT’L COMM’N ON CORR. HEALTH CARE, supra note 85, at 11. 
 90 Id. 
 91 First Report of the Office of Independent Medical Monitor, supra note 63, at 25. 
  
14 JOURNAL OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAW [Vol. 11:1 
 
tions, and the procedures for ordering non-formulary medications 
could pose serious safety concerns, aside from the paperwork burden 
the inadequacies of the formulary posed.92 
The process for dispensing medication is unnecessarily time-
consuming and wasteful.93  The medical records, which are partly 
electronic and partly paper, pose a barrier to patient care and de-
crease the productivity of staff, in significant part because of prob-
lems with the electronic medical records system that Michigan uses.94  
In fact, Serapis, the electronic medical records system, is so flawed 
that the NCCHC recommended that if Michigan intends to continue 
using it for any purpose, it should at least stop using it to record cer-
tain medical functions and instead revert to paper records.95 
The report also commented that the MDOC was “one of the most 
bureaucratic systems we have ever encountered,” and the report 
questioned whether the proliferation of bureaucratic procedures of 
dubious value undermined the system’s ability to complete necessary 
procedures.96  The proliferation of paperwork is “even worse” in 
health care, with the fifty-one Michigan prisons generating hundreds 
of reports each month that the NCCHC doubted would be read by 
anyone.97 
At the same time, the productivity of CMS medical staff was strik-
ingly low.  While the reviewers expected physicians to see an average 
of twenty patients per day, most CMS providers averaged eight to 
twelve per day, and one provider averaged five per day.  The NCCHC 
identified three factors contributing to the low productivity:  Serapis, 
the poorly functioning electronic medical record system; certain cus-
tody rules; and the fact that the providers are not employees of the 
MDOC.98 
The third point is the heart of the matter: 
  The providers have no incentive other than their own professional-
ism to see more patients.  All MDOC facilities have been completing 
[provider] Productivity Reports for several years.  The [MDOC Bureau of 
Health Care] administration says they cannot do anything about the situ-
ation, because they do not supervise the [providers].  They send the in-
formation on to the CMS administration, but nothing ever changes.  We 
were told by several MDOC staff that CMS administrators say they cannot 
 
 92 NAT’L COMM’N ON CORR. HEALTH CARE, supra note 85, at 13–14. 
 93 Id. at 16. 
 94 Id. at 16–20. 
 95 Id. at 20. 
 96 Id. at 22. 
 97 Id. at 22–23. 
 98 Id. at 23. 
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tell the [providers] what to do, because they are independent contractors 
and not employees.  Whatever the truth is, this situation must change. 
. . . . 
  The MDOC should seriously reconsider the advantages and disadvan-
tages of continuing to contract out provider services.99 
Not surprisingly, the report also found that the system lacked an 
effective quality improvement program or a functioning peer review 
system to assure health care quality.  Instead, the system’s ostensible 
quality improvement system amounted to mere “paper pushing.”100 
Many if not all of the problems the report identified stemmed 
from Michigan’s failure to write a proper contract with CMS and oth-
er contractors, including the company that provided the Serapis pro-
gram.  The NCCHC reviewers were told that CMS often unilaterally 
reduced its staff coverage for a particular position from five days a 
week to two days a week, and the contract did not provide any disin-
centive for CMS to do so.  In fact, the contract allows the prison sys-
tem to require CMS to fill these hours, but the system has not insisted 
on full staffing.101  Perhaps most damning, over the ten years of the 
contract, the NCCHC monitors were not provided with a single moni-
toring report, although the state was supposed to perform regular 
audits and CMS was supposed to be assessed liquidated damages at 
any facility that failed to achieve a designated level of compliance.  
Notwithstanding this provision, not a single claim for liquidated 
damages was ever made by the state:102 
Many staff verbalized that they have “heard from Lansing” [where the 
headquarters of the MDOC is located] that the MDOC simply needs to 
make the relationship with CMS “work.”  Whether or not anyone in the 
[MDOC] central office actually said this, this is what staff perceives.  The 
most glaring example of this is practitioner staffing shortages. . . .  Staff 
speculates that if the MDOC and CMS were operating in a truly arm’s 
length relationship, there should be an immediate response from the 
MDOC followed by rapid resolution of the problem, legal action, and/or 
termination of the contract.103 
Although the causes differ in part, the mental health program is 
also strikingly inefficient.  The program is divided between the Mich-
igan Department of Community Health, which provides the psychia-
trists and certain other staff, and the MDOC, which provides most of 
the psychologists.  Certain prisoners are placed on the outpatient 
 
 99 Id. at 24. 
100 Id. at 25. 
101 Id. at 32. 
102 Id. at 33. 
103 Id. 
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mental health team case load, and these prisoners have their mental 
health care provided by the Department of Community Health.  All 
of the other prisoners supposedly have their health care provided by 
the MDOC, including identification and initial treatment of patients 
experiencing a mental health crisis.104  This organizational structure is 
cumbersome and wastes resources.  It also creates problems because 
of disagreements between the two entities as to whether a prisoner 
needs treatment, and allows staff to disclaim responsibility for services 
that they consider not within their duties. 
IV.  TROUBLE AHEAD, TROUBLE BEHIND 
Michigan citizens are justly proud that their state supports one of 
the nation’s finest public universities, including a leading medical 
school.  In my view, they should also be proud that the state lacks a 
judicially-imposed death penalty.  Unfortunately, as the death of Mr. 
Souders and many others illustrate, Michigan has a randomly-
imposed death penalty for too many of its prisoners who have the 
misfortune to suffer from serious medical needs, and this accidental 
death penalty stems directly from public policy choices that have re-
sulted in an underfunded prison system confining prisoners for 
whom it is unable to provide minimally adequate medical care. 
Michigan has the sixth-largest prison population among the 
states,105 although it ranks eighth in total population.106  Three states 
with larger total populations—Ohio, Illinois, and Pennsylvania—have 
smaller prison populations.107  Michigan’s comparatively high rank in 
prison size108 reflects its comparatively high incarceration rate.109  This 
 
104 Id. at 33–34. 
105 See PUB. SAFETY PERFORMANCE PROJECT, PEW CHARITABLE TRUSTS, PUBLIC SAFETY, PUBLIC 
SPENDING:  FORECASTING AMERICA’S PRISON POPULATION 2007-2011, at 27 (rev. 2007), 
http://www.pewcenteronthestates.org/uploadedFiles/Public%20Safety%20Public
%20Spending.pdf. 
106 See U.S. Census Bureau, Resident Population of the 50 States, the District of Columbia, 
and Puerto Rico:  Census 2000, http://www. census.gov/population/www/cen2000/
maps/files/tab02.pdf (last visited Nov. 5, 2008). 
107 Compare id., with PUB. SAFETY PERFORMANCE PROJECT, supra note 105, at 27. 
108 Of course, the reality is that all fifty states have extremely draconian sentencing policies 
when compared to world norms.  The United States now has the highest incarceration 
rate in the world, and almost one-quarter of the world’s prisoners.  See CHRISTOPHER 
HARTNEY, NAT’L COUNCIL ON CRIME AND DELINQUENCY, FACT SHEET:  U.S. RATES OF 
INCARCERATION:  A GLOBAL PERSPECTIVE 1–2 (2006), available at http://www.nccd-
crc.org/nccd/pubs/2006nov_factsheet_incarceration.pdf.  If all the men, women, and 
children confined in our nation’s prisons and jail were gathered in one city, it would be 
the fourth largest city in the country.  Compare WILLIAM J. SABOL ET AL., BUREAU OF 
JUSTICE STATISTICS, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, PRISON AND JAIL INMATES AT MIDYEAR 2006 
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rate is an outlier in the Midwest region, and ten of the eleven other 
states in the region have rates lower than Michigan’s.110 
Nor can Michigan’s high incarceration rate be explained simply 
by its crime rate.  As shown in the table below, Michigan has the elev-
enth highest incarceration rate in the country, although it ranks sev-
enteenth in crime rates:111 
 Incarceration Rate Rank Crime Rate Rank 
Louisiana 1 6 
Texas 2 12 
Mississippi 3 32 
Oklahoma 4 14 
Alabama 5 22 
Georgia 6 39 
Missouri 7 16 
South Carolina 8 1 
Arizona 9 13 
Florida 10 2 
Michigan 11 17 
 
(2007), available at http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/bjs/pub/pdf/pjim06.pdf, with Press Re-
lease, U.S. Census Bureau, Census Bureau Announces Most Populous Cities (June 28, 
2007), available at http://www.census.gov/Press-Release/www/2007/cb07-91table1.pdf. 
109 Notwithstanding Michigan’s eleventh-place ranking among the states in incarceration 
rates, its incarceration rate of 489 prisoners per 100,000 total population is below the na-
tional average of 500 per 100,000.  Only nine states have above-average incarceration 
rates.  The nine states with incarceration rates higher than the national average are, in 
order, Louisiana, Texas, Mississippi, Oklahoma, Alabama, Georgia, Missouri, South Caro-
lina, and Arizona.  SABOL ET AL., supra note 108, at 13. 
110 Missouri is the exception with the seventh highest incarceration rate in the nation.  Id. 
111 U.S. Census Bureau, Statistical Abstract of the United States:  Violent Crime Per 100,000 
Population—2004, http://www.census.gov/statab/ranks/rank21.html (last visited Nov. 5, 
2008). 
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The chart demonstrates that incarceration rates are as much in-
fluenced by criminal justice sentencing policies as by crime rates.  
Only three of the eleven states with the highest incarceration rates 
have crime rates that also rank in the top eleven among the states.  
While crime rates matter in determining incarceration rates, criminal 
justice policies related to prosecution, sentencing, and parole matter 
at least as much. 
Michigan has adopted a relatively punitive set of criminal justice 
policies, in significant part related to its history of extraordinarily 
tough punishment for drug offenders.  In 1978, the state legislature 
imposed a mandatory punishment of life imprisonment without pa-
role for persons convicted of possession of 650 grams of cocaine or 
heroin.112  Not even convictions for rape or mayhem were punished as 
harshly as persons punished under this drug possession statute; the 
only other crime that Michigan punished equally harshly was first de-
gree murder.113  No other jurisdiction imposed a mandatory sentence 
of life imprisonment without parole for first-time possession of illegal 
drugs in comparable quantities.114  Although the statute requiring a 
mandatory life sentence for drug possession was repealed in 1998, 
and prisoners convicted under the law subsequently received parole 
eligibility,115 in the last five years, the Parole Board has granted parole 
to eligible lifers at the rate of 0.2% per year.116  In 2002 to 2003, more 
than 9% of the Michigan prison population was serving a life sen-
tence, amounting to almost 4,600 prisoners.  As of 2002 to 2003, 
Michigan had the fourth-largest number of lifers of any prison system 
in the nation.117  More than half of those prisoners were serving life 
 
112 Families Against Mandatory Minimums, Background on Michigan Mandatory Minimum 
Drug Law Reforms, http://www.famm.org/ExploreSentencing/StateSentencing/Mich
iganFAMMCampaign.aspx (last visited Nov. 5, 2008). 
113 Harmelin v. Michigan, 501 U.S. 957, 1025–26 (1991) (White, J., dissenting). 
114 Id. at 1026. 
115 For a background on Michigan reforms, see supra note 112.  See also BETHANY WICKSALL,  
MICH. STATE SENATE FISCAL AGENCY, STATE NOTES:  THE MICHIGAN PRISON POPULATION:  
MEN’S DECLINING BUT WOMEN’S STILL RISING (2003), available at http://www.
senate.michigan.gov/sfa/Publications/Notes/2003Notes/NotesJulAug03bw.pdf. 
116 Foster-Bey v. Rubitschun, No. 05-71318, slip. op. at 42 (E.D. Mich. Oct. 23, 2007) (finding 
that changes in parole policy have resulted in decreased eligibility for paroles of non-
mandatory life sentences; in the last five years the Parole Board has granted such paroles 
at the rate of 0.2% of eligible prisoners).  The state legislative research bureau noted that 
as many as 700 persons serving a lifetime sentence for drug possession with no other con-
victions were eligible to be paroled.  WICKSALL, supra note 115. 
117 MARC MAUER ET AL., THE SENTENCING PROJECT, THE MEANING OF “LIFE”:  LONG PRISON 
SENTENCES IN CONTEXT 10 (2004), available at http://www.sentencingproject.org/
Admin/Documents/publications/inc_meaningoflife.pdf. 
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without the possibility of parole.118  For lifers who were eligible for pa-
role, the average sentence length for lifers who did gain release in-
creased to an average of 23.2 years during 2000 to 2004; apparently 
many of the lifers released in these years were released on medical 
parole,119 which typically implies that the prisoner has a terminal ill-
ness or some other incapacitating medical or mental health condi-
tion.120  Thus, the combination of a large state population, a relatively 
high crime rate, and a particularly severe set of sentencing and re-
lease policies have resulted in nearly 50,000 prisoners behind bars. 
V.  AND IT’S A HARD RAIN’S-A-GONNA FALL 
As noted above, Michigan’s criminal justice system combines a 
number of elements that fuel a particularly expensive prison system; 
that is, a state with a large population, a state with a very high incar-
ceration rate and an aging prisoner population reflecting a history of 
unusually punitive criminal justice policies, and a state that receives 
poor value for its expenditures on prison health care.  In addition, 
Michigan, unlike the majority of the states with comparatively high 
incarceration rates, also has comparatively high per prisoner incar-
ceration costs.  Locking people in prison is, under any circumstances, 
an expensive business, and Michigan policy makers appear to have 
done virtually everything within their power to make it more expen-
sive. 
By 2003, the nation spent $61 billion just on corrections, out of a 
total spending on the criminal justice system of $186 billion.121  The 
most recent available figures for the cost of incarceration per pris-
oner average $22,650.122  That average cost, however, is subject to 
wide variation.  If we look again at the eleven states including Michi-
gan with the highest incarceration rates in the country, we find that 
six of them rank among the ten states with the lowest per prisoner 
costs.123 
 
 
 
118 Id. 
119 Foster-Bey, No. 05-71318,at 25–26, 38, 42. 
120 Michigan law provides that the “parole board may grant a medical parole for a prisoner 
determined to be physically or mentally incapacitated.”  MICH. COMP. LAWS § 791.235(10) 
(2008). 
121 PUB. SAFETY PERFORMANCE PROJECT, supra note 105, at 2. 
122 Id. at 18. 
123 The data in the Table are derived from id. at 27, 33. 
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 Incarceration 
Rate Rank 
Lowest Per-Prisoner 
Cost Rank 
Louisiana 1 1 
Texas 2 7 
Mississippi 3 4 
Oklahoma 4 10 
Alabama 5 2 
Georgia 6 11 
Missouri 7 6 
South Carolina 8 3 
Arizona 9 16 
Florida 10 22 
Michigan 11 36 
 
Michigan is the only state with a high incarceration rate that also 
ranks above the state median in per-prisoner cost.  In fact, Michigan 
also ranks well above the national average cost of incarceration, and it 
is the only state on the chart with a per-prisoner cost that exceeds the 
national average. 
The approximately 50,000 Michigan prisoners cost the state an 
average of $28,743 per prisoner, in contrast to a federal average per-
prisoner cost of $23,429 and a state average per-prisoner cost of 
$23,876.124  The Pew Charitable Trust analysis found that the two crit-
ical factors in determining comparative per-prisoner incarceration 
costs among the states are variations in the cost of employee wages 
and benefits and variations in the prisoner-to-staff ratio.125  In a 2002 
survey, base pay for correctional officers in Michigan was the sixth 
 
124 Id. at 33. 
125 Id. at 19. 
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highest in the country.126  Wages and benefits have made up 71% of 
the total operating costs of the Michigan prison system,127 although 
on average, these expenses in state correctional systems account for 
about two-thirds of the systems’ total operating costs.128 
Aside from the fact that MDOC wages and benefits account for a 
somewhat high percentage of operating expenses, there is other evi-
dence that its comparatively high per-prisoner cost does not reflect a 
high ratio of staff to prisoner.  The union that represents correctional 
officers in Michigan claims that the number of state correctional offi-
cers declined from 10,600 to 9,200 between 2000 and 2005, despite 
an increase of several thousand in the prison population.129 
Michigan can no longer afford to pursue this discordant cluster of 
policies.  Most states that provide abysmal medical care at least get 
what they pay for; Michigan cannot even make that statement.  Even 
in the best of times, high incarceration rates combined with high in-
carceration costs result in difficult financial burdens, as large num-
bers of states have recognized.130  Because of the state’s high number 
of lifers and its long sentences for drug crimes, Michigan’s prison 
population contains many older prisoners who tend to need more 
expensive medical care.  When one adds in the high staff costs and 
the waste of large amounts of money in the dysfunctional medical 
care system, the cost of the system would not be sustainable over the 
long term in relatively good economic times. 
Of course, these are not good economic times, particularly in 
Michigan.  For over a year, the state has been caught up in a “one-
state recession,” with the highest unemployment rate in the nation.131  
As the economic downturn has worsened, the state has experienced a 
major state budget crisis.132  Part of the MDOC’s response to the re-
duction in its share of the state budget was to close the Southern 
 
126 Posting of Tom Walsh, Michigan’s Budget Crisis Means We Have to Live Like We’re No. 
25, to WZZM13.com, http://wzzm13.com/news/news_article.aspx?storyid=70480 (Feb. 
12, 2007, 08:55:24 EST). 
127 STEPHAN, supra note 82, at 4. 
128 Id. 
129 Press Release, Mich. Corr. Org., Michigan Corrections Officer Union to Hold Statewide 
Pickets to Protest Dangerous Staffing and Safety Levels in State Prisons (May 24, 2005), 
available at http://seiu526m.localsonline.org/ourlocal/press.cfm?pressReleaseID=
1612&bSuppressLayout=1. 
130 MAUER ET AL., supra note 117, at 25–26. 
131 CNNMoney.com, Unemployment State by State, http://money.cnn.com/pf/features/
lists/state_unemployment/ (last visited Nov. 5, 2008). 
132 Michigan Department of Treasury, Budget Crisis Grows Deeper, http://www.michigan.
gov/treasury/0,1607,7-121-1755_1963-168824--,00.html (last visited Nov. 5, 2008). 
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Michigan Correctional Facility, the prison where Mr. Souders and 
many others died.133  I have no doubt that the major motivating factor 
for the closure was the desire to save money by moving the concen-
trated population of sick prisoners to prisons not subject to the Hadix 
orders.  Now that these high-risk prisoners have been dispersed 
throughout the system, it is highly likely that their medical care will 
deteriorate further. 
Aside from the moral responsibility that Michigan politicians and 
the MDOC bear for Mr. Souders’s death and their refusal to prevent 
future deaths, the current cluster of policies and practices are on a 
collision course with reality.  Michigan taxpayers are likely to find the 
state paying large jury damages awards related to some of these 
deaths.134  The MDOC also risks new class actions seeking injunctive 
relief at the facilities to which large numbers of the chronically ill 
prisoners were transferred.135 
More importantly, until Michigan fundamentally reforms its sen-
tencing and parole policies, as well as its system for delivering health 
care, prisoners like Timothy Souders will continue to suffer a death 
sentence for the crime of mental or physical illness.  Until fundamen-
tal change occurs, I can only echo the words of Richard A. Enslen, 
the Hadix federal judge who brought to public attention the failures 
in the Michigan system:  “Say a prayer for T.S. and the others who 
have passed.  Any earthly help comes far too late for them.”136 
 
133 Michigan Department of Corrections, Southern Michigan Correctional Facility (JMF) 
Closed November 17, 2007, http://www.michigan.gov/corrections/0,1607,7-119-1381_
1388-5357--,00.html (last visited Nov. 5, 2008). 
134 The estate of Jeffrey Clark, a prisoner at the Bellamy Creek Correctional Facility in Mich-
igan, was awarded $2,750,000 by a federal jury based on his death from dehydration in a 
hot cell after prison staff turned off the water in his cell and failed to give him water to 
drink at a time when he suffered from apparent mental illness.  Firm Fights for Justice in 
Prison Deaths, THE FIEGER TIMES (Fieger, Fieger, Kenney, Johnson & Giroux P.C., South-
field, Mich.), Winter 2007-2008, at 3, available at http://www.fiegerlaw.com/pdf/2008-
vol17.pdf.  A damages action in federal court on behalf of the estate of Timothy Souders 
was recently settled by the state for an undisclosed sum.  Dennis Pelham, State Settles Law-
suit Over Adrian Man’s Prison Death, DAILY TELEGRAM (Adrian, Mich.), July 7, 2008, avail-
able at http://www.lenconnect.com/archive/x1346879050/State-settles-lawsuit-over-
Adrian-man-s-prison-death. 
135 Most of the chronically ill prisoners were transferred to a handful of prisons.  See Cohen 
Letter, supra note 47 (describing and critiquing the state’s proposed transfer plan). 
136 Hadix II, 461 F. Supp. 2d 574, 576 (W.D. Mich. 2006). 
